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On 24 October 2012, a patient with acute respiratory 
distress syndrome of unknown origin and symptom 
onset on 5 October was transferred from Qatar to a 
specialist lung clinic in Germany. Late diagnosis on 20 
November of an infection with the novel Coronavirus 
(NCoV) resulted in potential exposure of a consider-
able number of healthcare workers. Using a question-
naire we asked 123 identified contacts (120 hospital 
and three out-of-hospital contacts) about exposure to 
the patient. Eighty-five contacts provided blood for a 
serological test using a two-stage approach with an 
initial immunofluorescence assay as screening test, 
followed by recombinant immunofluorescence assays 
and a NCoV-specific serum neutralisation test. Of 123 
identified contacts nine had performed aerosol-gen-
erating procedures within the third or fourth week of 
illness, using personal protective equipment rarely or 
never, and two of these developed acute respiratory 
illness. Serology was negative for all nine. Further 76 
hospital contacts also tested negative, including two 
sera initially reactive in the screening test. The con-
tact investigation ruled out transmission to contacts 
after illness day 20. Our two-stage approach for sero-
logical testing may be used as a template for similar 
situations.
Introduction
A novel human coronavirus (NCoV) has recently 
emerged in the Arabian Peninsula. The first two 
reported cases infected by the novel agent, then pro-
visionally termed hCoV-EMC, occurred in June and 
September 2012, respectively [1-3]. As of 18 February 
2013, a total of 12 cases have been confirmed by WHO 
[4], including five deaths. Among five cases reported 
from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, three were part 
of a family cluster. Two further cases were linked to 
probable exposure in Qatar, and two cases were con-
firmed retrospectively, by diagnostic of respiratory 
specimens, from Jordan with disease onset in April 
2012. The latter were part of a cluster of 11 patients 
with acute respiratory symptoms linked to a hospital 
[5]. The most recent three cases identified constitute 
another cluster that occurred in the United Kingdom 
(UK) in January to February 2013 [4]. The index case in 
this cluster is a UK citizen with travel history to Saudi-
Arabia and Pakistan before symptom onset [5]. Two of 
his family members who had not travelled outside the 
UK and became ill were most likely infected through 
person-to-person transmission. While one of them had 
an underlying disease and died, the other presented 
with milder, influenza-like illness symptoms only. 
Because of the long period, 10 months, over which the 
cases occurred, the source and transmission patterns 
of the virus remain elusive. Hypotheses include a pre-
dominance of zoonotic acquisitions with little poten-
tial for human-to-human transmission [5], widespread 
and unnoticed occurrence of clinically mild infections, 
and finally the possibility of an early-stage epidemic 
caused by a highly pathogenic novel human virus.
Because of the potential of human-to-human trans-
mission in the hospital outbreak in Jordan and the 
family clusters, as well as the observed severity of 
disease, current recommendations regarding protec-
tive measures rely on experiences with severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 [6]. The first of 
the two Qatari patients was treated in the UK where, 
under strict isolation measures, no secondary cases 
occurred. Investigations by polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) of 10 healthcare workers (HCW) who had cared 
for the patient and subsequently developed mild res-
piratory disease yielded no evidence of infection [7]. 
However, to date, published investigations of individu-
als with proven exposure to NCoV have not presented 
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a strategy how to identify retrospectively infections in 
a large group of (contact) persons through serological 
testing. 
On 22 November 2012, the Robert Koch Institute 
in Berlin, Germany, was informed according to the 
International Health Regulations [8] about a case 
of NCoV infection in a Quatari patient in his forties, 
treated in Germany (Figure). After an acute onset of 
symptoms on 5 October, he had been admitted to a 
hospital in Doha, Qatar, on 13 October, where he devel-
oped respiratory failure requiring ventilation, and was 
reported to have had temporary renal impairment. On 
24 October, he was transferred to a specialist lung 
hospital in Essen, Germany. A respiratory sample had 
been taken in Qatar on 17 October. After some delay 
due to difficulties with the shipment of specimens, 
the sample tested positive for NCoV in a laboratory in 
the UK. The result was consequently communicated by 
the UK Health Protection Agency to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) on 21 November 2012. Until that 
date the hospital in Essen had not considered NCoV in 
the differential diagnoses for the patient. Only routine 
personal protection of HCW and no specific measures 
of respiratory protection had been followed during the 
whole course of treatment in the intensive care unit 
(ICU). After weeks of mechanical ventilation in ICU, the 
patient was discharged on 21 November. A lag time of 
four weeks between patient transfer and laboratory 
confirmation of the NCoV infection resulted in potential 
exposure of a considerable number of HCW in Germany. 
Here we report on an interview with the patient asking 
for potential sources of infection, the investigation of 
individuals exposed to the patient, virological investi-
gation of respiratory samples from the patient as well 
as an approach used to test retrospectively a large 
number of contacts.
Methods
Patient interview and samples for 
laboratory investigation
After the patient had recovered he was interviewed in 
person. The interview was conducted in Arabic with 
the help of an interpreter. It was targeted at potential 
modes of acquisition of the infection. The question-
naire contained questions about the early course of 
disease, social status, living conditions, profession, 
hobbies and regular activities, exposure to animals, 
eating habits, and contacts with individuals with res-
piratory illness in the 10 days before his illness onset. 
We searched for stored respiratory and blood samples 
at the hospital laboratory that were still available to be 
tested for NCoV and identified a specimen that origi-
nated from a bronchioalveolar lavage (BAL) done on 25 
October, illness day 20 (i.e. late third illness week), as 
well as a serum sample from the same day. In addition, 
on 23 November (eighth illness week), we took a phar-
yngeal wash and a serum sample from the patient after 
he was discharged and had started his rehabilitation 
program on 21 November. Both respiratory samples 
were tested by real-time reverse-transcription (RT)-
PCR. The first sample was also subjected to virus isola-
tion in LLC-MK2 cells. 
Figure
Timeline of disease of novel coronavirus case and possible exposure of healthcare workers, Germany October–November 2012
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Contact persons were identified based on electronic 
procedures registration, supplemented by a targeted 
request to HCW to report contact with the patient while 
in ICU (and during the transport to the hospital). The 
electronic registration of procedures requires that any 
person performing a task in the patient’s room must 
sign in, sign out and document which procedure was 
conducted. Using a standardised questionnaire, infor-
mation was collected about the time of the first con-
tact, types of contact, closest distance to the patient, 
frequency of using a surgical face mask when in con-
tact with the patient, and occurrence of acute respira-
tory illness (ARI) up to ten days after the last contact 
with the patient. No information was collected on the 
duration or frequency of contact. 
Consenting individuals gave blood for serological test-
ing on one of three dates (3, 7 or 14 December). The 
median interval from first patient contact to venipunc-
ture was 39 days (range: 13–50 days). Contacts were 
considered at high risk if they had their first contact 
with the patient at the beginning of his stay in ICU, 
i.e. at the end of the patient ś third or fourth week of 
illness, if they had conducted an aerosol-generating 
procedure, such as suctioning the intubated patient or 
performing a BAL, and if they had rarely or never used 
surgical face masks while caring for the patient. 
Laboratory methods
Nucleic acid detection was performed by RT-PCR 
as described previously [9,10] after viral RNA was 
extracted from 300 µl of bronchioalveolar lavage using 
the MagAttract Viral RNA Kit M48 (Qiagen GmbH, 
Hilden, Germany). 
Serological testing was performed in a two-stage 
approach. As a first step, screening for antibodies 
reactive to NCoV was done by indirect immunofluo-
rescence assay (IFA) as described previously [10]. 
Preliminary evaluation of IFA on 50 sera from blood 
donors yielded no reactivity. For resolution of reac-
tive results, IFA was done on Vero B4 cells expressing 
recombinant spike (S) and nucleocapsid (N) proteins of 
NCoV, SARS-CoV, hCoV-OC43, and hCoV-NL63. Details 
of procedures for recombinant IFA are outlined in 
Corman et al. [10]. For serum neutralisation tests (SNT), 
Vero B4 cells were grown to subconfluence in 24 well 
plates. Preincubation involved 25 plaque-forming units 
of NCoV in 100 µl of medium, mixed 1:1 with patient 
sera prediluted in medium as indicated. The starting 
dilution was 1:8. After 1 h incubation at 37 °C, each 
well was infected for 1 h at 37 °C using the total 200 
µl preincubation reaction. Supernatants were removed 
and overlaid with Avicell resin exactly as described by 
Herzog et al. [11]. Assays were terminated and stained 
after three days.
Statistical tests
Comparison of frequency distributions were done using 
Fisher’s exact test. 
Ethical clearance and data protection
The contact investigation was carried out based on 
legal requirements of the Protection against Infection 
Act of Germany [12] and the International Health 
Regulations [8], and was led by the local health author-
ities. After information about the investigation and its 
aims, contacts signed a consent form if they agreed 
with the analysis of blood samples. All questionnaires 
and samples were fully anonymised before analysis. 
Results
Patient interview
The patient reported to live in Doha, Qatar. He used to 
be a heavy smoker (2 to 3 packs of cigarettes per day), 
but denied smoking waterpipe or chewing qat. Disease 
onset was rapid, with initial symptoms including fever 
(40 °C), cough, runny nose, and shortness of breath. 
Subjective weakness was pronounced. After the first 
two days of illness he improved a little but deterio-
rated again, and was finally admitted to hospital on 
day eight of illness because of increasing dyspnoea. 
He reported no subjective symptoms of renal impair-
ment such as foamy urine, reduced urine output, or 
back pain. He had not travelled and had no known con-
tact with any other reported cases of NCoV infection. 
The patient owned a camel and goat farm and reported 
a large number of casual contacts (approx. 50 persons 
per day) on a regular basis. He remembered that before 
his disease onset some goats were ill and had fever. 
He did not have direct contact with the goats or any 
other animals especially falcons or bats, but said he 
had eaten goat meat. He also reported to have had 
contact with one of his animal caretakers who was ill 
with severe cough and was hospitalised. Other than 
the animal caretaker, he did not remember persons 
with severe respiratory illnesses in his wider or closer 
social environment. 
Patient samples
 Virus detection in the initial sample from illness day 20 
and preliminary serological investigations have been 
described by Corman et al. [10]. Isolation of virus in cell 
culture failed. Serological testing yielded an IgM titre 
against NCoV of 1:1,000 and an IgG titre of 1:10,000 
at day 20 (week three) of illness. At week eight of ill-
ness the IgG titre was still at 1:10,000 while the IgM 
titre had already decreased to 1:100. SNT titres against 
NCoV were 1:640 at week three and 1:640 at week eight 
of illness. The pharyngeal wash sample taken on 23 
November 2012 (week eight of illness) tested negative 
by real-time RT-PCR. 
Contact investigation
We identified 120 hospital and three out-of-hospital 
contacts, including the interpreter of the patient. 
Protective measures were largely limited to HCW wear-
ing gloves and gowns when providing intimate care and 
use of surgical face masks during suctioning. From 31 
October until 4 November (illness weeks five and six), 
the patient was isolated using barrier nursing due to 
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a concurrent Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection. This 
included use of surgical masks only. Among the 120 
hospital contacts the largest group were nurses (n=59; 
49%), followed by physicians (n=26; 22%) and labo-
ratory technicians (n=15; 13%) (Table 1). Median time 
from first contact to venipuncture was 39 days (range: 
13–50 days). 
Eighty-five (69%) of all respondents reported contact 
at a distance of less than or equal to 2 m, 14 (11%) of 
more than 2 m, and 24 (20%) of unknown distance 
to the patient. Frequency of ARI by week of first con-
tact differed significantly among the groups (Table 
1). However, there was no trend in the ARI proportion 
over time: eight of 33 contacts with first exposure dur-
ing illness weeks three or four experienced ARI within 
10 days of last contact; five of nine contacts with first 
exposure during the patient’s fifth week of illness; and 
none of 14 with first contact during week six of illness 
developed ARI. 
Among 81 contacts reporting exposure within 2 m, 21 
had ARI compared to none of 14 with contact of more 
than 2 m (p value; 0.04) (Table 1). Among those with 
first exposure in week three or four of illness of the 
patient, the proportion of contacts with ARI was not 
significantly different between those considered to be 
at high risk and the remaining contacts (p value, 0.87) 
(Table 1). Thirteen HCW had contact to the patient in 
weeks three or four of illness, had contact within 2 m 
to the patient and had worn surgical face masks rarely 
or never. Among these, nine were high-risk contacts, 
including one nurse who assisted in a bronchoscopy 
on 25 October. All nine provided a blood sample. The 
median time after last contact with the patient for 
these nine HCW was 32 days (range: 13–46 days). No 
sample was reactive by IFA. 
Of the remaining 76 blood samples, one serum showed 
reactivity for IgM even at dilutions up to 1:100. This titre 
could be resolved as a cross-reacting recent infection 
with hCoV-NL63 by IFA using recombinant S and N pro-
teins from major hCoVs (Table 2), as well as absence of 
NCoV-specific neutralising antibodies. Another serum 
showed indeterminate IgG-reactivity in a 1:10 dilution. 
Specific anti-NCoV antibodies were ruled out by recom-
binant IFA, indicating earlier infection with hCoV-OC43 
and hCoV-NL63, as well as absence of any significant 
titre in SNT (Table 2). 
Discussion
Here we describe a case and contact investigation of 
a laboratory-confirmed patient with NCoV infection for 
whom the suspicion of this possible aetiology had not 
been discussed with the treating hospital upon admis-
sion of the patient. The patient still tested PCR-positive 
late in his third week of illness. Despite this we con-
cluded from the laboratory findings that his infectious-
ness was then absent or very low. While at that time no 
consistent dedicated personal protective measures had 
been applied by HCW caring for the patient, our public 
health investigation did not show infection in any of 
the 85 serologically tested contact persons, mainly 
HCW. The conducted serological two-stage approach 
was an effective method of screening a large number 
of contact persons for infection. 
For initial risk assessment, after the information in 
November about the cause of the patient’s disease, it 
was important to know if he had been potentially infec-
tious at the time of arrival at the hospital in Germany 
in October. One stored respiratory sample taken at the 
time of admission, yielded clear, albeit very low quan-
tities of NCoV RNA in the range of 66.5 to 100 copies 
per mL [10]. Attempts to isolate virus from this sample 
were unsuccessful. Even though the sample had been 
stored for prolonged time under less-than-optimal 
conditions, these combined RT-PCR and cell culture 
data suggested absent or very low infectiousness at 
the time of admission. Negative RT-PCR four weeks 
later, just after discharge from hospital, suggested the 
patient had cleared the virus, and no further respira-
tory precautions were necessary upon admission to the 
rehabilitation centre. 
Nevertheless, anxiety and lack of any other epidemi-
ological data made it necessary to gauge rapidly the 
significance of some cases of ARI experienced in HCW 
who had been in contact with the patient. Our data 
yielded no direct correlation of ARI rates with time of 
exposure. In particular, those contacts considered at 
highest risk had no more ARI than other contacts who 
also had their first contact with the patient during the 
third or fourth illness week. 
In the context of a retrospective contact investigation, 
our two-staged serological approach proved effec-
tive in ruling out any NCoV infections among contacts 
including those who developed acute respiratory dis-
ease. Preliminary screening using a generic serologi-
cal test provides a reliable result for negative samples. 
Hereafter only positive or indeterminate results need 
to be further scrutinised using the described methods. 
During two interviews that the patient kindly agreed to, 
we explored a wide spectrum of factors that he might 
have been exposed to. Even though NCoV is geneti-
cally similar to bat coronaviruses [1,13,14], other ani-
mals may serve as (intermediate) host as well. While 
our patient denied contact to bats, he remembered 
ill goats among the animals on his farm. Albarrak et 
al. reported that the first Saudi case was exposed to 
farm animals, but the first Qatari patient and the sec-
ond Saudi patient were not [15]. Although our patient 
reported no direct contact with his animals, one ani-
mal caretaker working for him was ill with cough and 
might have been an intermediate link in the chain of 
infection. 
Coronaviruses do infect ruminants such as goats 
[16] and thus goats could be considered as a possi-
ble source of origin for the novel virus, particularly in 
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Table 1
Profession, type of contact, occurrence of acute respiratory illness and serological results in contacts of case of novel 
coronavirus infection, Germany October–November 2012
Variable N N (with information) %  P value
a
Contacts 123 123 100 –
Hospital staff 120 123 98 –
Out-of-hospital persons 3 123 2 –
Response to questionnaire 110 123 89 –
Acute respiratory infection 24 104 23 –
Provided blood sample 85 123 69 –
Interval between first contact and venipuncture (n=48) median: 39 days (range: 13–50) –
Serology for antibodies against NCoV
Positive 0 85 0 –
Negative 85 85 100 –
Professional group among hospital staff
Nursing staff 59 120 49 –
Physicians 26 120 22 –
Laboratory technicians 15 120 13 –
Physician and team assistants 13 120 11 –
Physiotherapists 4 120 3 –
House maintenance 4 120 3 –
Cleaning staff 2 120 2 –
Contact distance to patients
≤2 metres 85 123 69 –
>2 metres 14 123 11 –
Unknown 24 123 20 –
First contact in the 3rd or 4th week of patient’s illness
Yes 36 123 29 –
Later or unknown 87 123 71 –
ARI by contact distance to patients
≤2 metres 21 81 26
0.04
> 2 metres 0 14 0
ARI by week of first contact
3rd/4th illness week 8 33 24
<0.015th illness week 5 9 56
6th illness week or later 0 17 0
ARI in those exposed in 3rd or 4th week, by risk level
High risk, i.e. performing aerosol-generating procedures,
face mask rarely/not worn 2 9 22 0.87
All others  6 24 25
High-risk contactsb
who provided blood 9 9 100 –
Interval between last contact and venipuncture (n=9) median: 27 days (range: 12–46) –
ARI: acute respiratory illness; NCoV: novel coronavirus.
a Based on Fisher’s exact test.
b A high-risk contact is a contact who had contact in the (3rd or) 4th week of the patient’s illness, performed aerosol-generating procedures 
and wore face mask rarely or not at all.
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the geographical and cultural context of our patient. 
Recent experimental studies have found that NCoV can 
infect and replicate in cells of various species including 
humans, swine, monkeys and bats, suggesting a more 
promiscuous host specificity compared to other human 
coronaviruses such as SARS CoV [17]. Susceptibility of 
goat cells was not tested, but it cannot be excluded 
that NCoV might infect this species as well. 
Especially hospitals with ICU, specialist lung hospitals 
and similar facilities should consider NCoV in patients 
with severe respiratory disease of unknown aetiology. 
These patients should be tested for the novel virus as 
well as pathogens causing illnesses that need to be 
considered for differential diagnosis in severe lung dis-
ease. Full personal protective equipment such as rec-
ommended for handling patients with SARS, including 
N95 masks independent of the procedure performed, 
should be used by HCW in such cases, and responsi-
ble public health agencies should be informed timely. 
In general, it is prudent that HCW in contact with any 
patient with a severe respiratory illness of unknown 
origin apply droplet precautions. Should patients with 
suspected NCoV infections be transferred for special 
treatment it is important to fully inform the receiving 
hospital. Public health management recommendations 
should be further informed through future research 
that include the route, amount and duration of virus 
shedding. In addition, more information is needed 
on the ability of the virus to transmit from person to 
person. 
Our investigation has some important limitations. We 
have not obtained a questionnaire and blood from all 
contacts of this patient. Nevertheless, response rate 
was high and information on contacts with the highest 
risk for infection was complete. Available information 
on the interval between exposure and venipuncture 
could only be approximated because contacts were 
exposed over more than one day. In our study we used 
the day of first contact because the patient was likely 
most infectious at this point in time. Theoretically, 
seroconversion may have occurred in some after con-
tacts had provided blood. However, the need to rap-
idly evaluate the situation urged us to commence the 
contact investigation immediately. A further limitation 
is that the patient’s negative result of virus isolation 
could have been due to the long storage time of the 
Table 2
Cross-reactivity test on contact persons and of case of novel coronavirus infection (at week 3 and week 8 of illness) with 
recombinant spike and nucleocapsid indirect fluorescence antibody testa, Germany October–November 2012
Virus Antibody type Contact 1 Contact 2 Patient(week 3)
Patient




IgMc +/− +/− >1:320d >1:320 −
IgG − − >1:320 >1:320 −
Nucleocapsid
IgM − 1:20 ND − −
IgG  – +/− ND + −
SARS-CoV
Spike
IgM +/− − ND + −
IgG − − ND − −
Nucleocapsid
IgM −  − ND − −
IgG − − ND − ++
hCoV-OC43
Spike
IgM +/− / + − + + −
IgG ++ >1:80 ++ ++ +++
Nucleocapsid
IgM − − +/− +/− −
IgG +/− / + +/- +/− / + +/− / + +
hCoV-NL63
Spike
IgM 1:80 +/− 1:80 >1:320 −
IgG >1:320 1:20 >1:320 >1:320 −
Nucleocapsid
IgM −. − ND  − −
IgG ++ +/− ND +/− / + −
CoV: Corona virus; hCov: human coronavirus; NCoV: novel coronavirus; ND: not done; SARS: severe acute respiratory syndrome.
a All sera were applied in a 1:20 dilution and rated from negative (−), intermediate (+/−) to positive (+ until +++).
b A non-patient contact negative-control serum.
c IgG depleted.
d Titres (selective) were determined by serial dilutions in a range of 1:20 to 1:640.
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sample – in contrast to our favoured hypothesis of low 
RNA concentration. 
In spite of this, we believe that it is fair to conclude the 
patient’s infectiousness on illness day 20 was absent 
or very low. Our contact investigation has found no 
evidence of infection among hospital or out-of-hospi-
tal contacts. Our two-staged approach to serological 
screening where a first-line testing is done by full-virus 
IFA and supplemented by confirmatory recombinant IFA 
and SNT should provide a template for similar investi-
gations in the future. Finally, if patients suspected to 
be infected with NCoV are to be transferred for special-
ised treatment, receiving hospitals need to be informed 
so that appropriate infection control measures can be 
implemented. 
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